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Abstract 
This paper establishes that long-term exposure to statehood is detrimental to building 
politically stable regimes outside Europe. It argues that accumulated statehood experience 
impeded the diffusion of European institutions and was conductive to the early emergence 
of powerful elites, leading to contemporary institutional stagnation. This undermines the 
provision of public goods and lowers the opportunity cost of engaging in riots, arguably 
giving rise to socio-political unrest. Using data for 109 non-European societies, the study 
documents evidence that a long history of statehood is linked to the persistence of political 
instability. The main findings withstand numerous robustness analyses.  
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The pervasiveness of social and political unrest remains an enduring feature of many societies 
across the globe, and appears to be one of the most serious barriers to achieving sustainable 
economic development. A direct negative consequence of riots and violent conflicts is substantial 
loss of human life. More specifically, over 16 million deaths worldwide have been attributed to 
civil conflicts since the end of the Second World War (Arbatlı et al., 2020). Additionally, the 
persistence and pervasiveness of socio-political unrest may impose considerable economic costs 
through inducing political instability or uncertainty.1 It is widely acknowledged that politically 
unstable economies find it difficult to maintain social order, and tend to adopt suboptimal 
economic policies (Carmignani, 2003; Azzimonti, 2011; Aisen & Veiga, 2013). Previous studies 
document that political instability transmits to underdevelopment through various channels, 
including, but not limited to, lower growth rates (Alesina & Perotti, 1996; Jong-A-Pin, 2009; Aisen 
& Veiga, 2013), reduced firms’ investment (Julio & Yook, 2012), lower levels of human capital 
accumulation (Azzimonti, 2011), environmental deterioration (Fredriksson & Svensson, 2003) and 
an unequal distribution of income (Dutt & Mitra, 2008). 
Against this background, the main objective of this paper is to uncover one of the deepest 
origins of political instability. To this end, the study exploits international variation in long-term 
exposure to statehood to explain the persistence and pervasiveness of social and political unrest 
across the world. Considering this inquiry, I find inspiration in numerous influential contributions 
to the comparative development literature highlighting the role of accumulated statehood 
experience in shaping contemporary economic performance (see, for example, Bockstette et al., 
2002; Chanda & Putterman, 2007; Putterman & Weil, 2010; Spolaore & Wacziarg, 2013; Borcan 
et al., 2018).2 The conventional wisdom of this growing body of research postulates that the early 
emergence of state-like polities conferred a present-day society with strengthened fiscal and 
organizational capabilities, leading to higher levels of income per capita (Bockstette et al., 2002). 
More specifically, the idea that history casts a long shadow on today’s economic prosperity builds 
upon the seminal article by Bockstette et al. (2002) that constructs a novel index of state history. 
These authors attempt to measure cross-country differences in accumulated statehood experience 
                                                          
1 As defined by the World Bank, political instability refers to the probability that a government can be overthrown or 
destabilized by unconstitutional methods and/or politically motivated violence (see Section 3 for details). 
2 Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013) provide a comprehensive review of studies investigating the deep historical roots of 
comparative cross-country economic performance. 
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based on three aspects of state formation and development, including the early emergence of a 
state above the tribal level, the territorial coverage of a state and the autonomy of a government. 
Subsequent research reveals that state history is conducive to establishing well-functioning 
financial markets (Ang, 2013a) and inclusive institutions (Ang, 2013b). These findings are 
consistent with previous studies documenting the beneficial role of early state development 
(Bockstette et al., 2002; Chanda & Putterman, 2007; Putterman & Weil, 2010). Nevertheless, some 
scholars provide suggestive evidence that excessive statehood experience is an impediment to 
achieving higher levels of productivity and GDP per capita (Lagerlöf, 2016; Borcan et al., 2018; 
Harish & Paik, 2020), building democratic institutions (Hariri, 2012) and creating an egalitarian 
society (Vu, 2021).3 Taken altogether, the existing literature offers highly mixed findings when it 
comes to investigating the economic impacts of state history, making it difficult to reconcile the 
long-run legacy of early state development. Importantly, earlier contributions to this strand of 
literature remain largely silent about how state history helps shape international differences in 
political instability. It is surprising how little attention has been paid to this inquiry given that 
socio-political unrest is a widespread social concern in many societies across the world. 
A key contribution of the study lies in the exploration of the extent to which statehood 
experience, accumulated over a period of six millennia, matters for a country’s ability to establish 
politically stable regimes in present times. Unfortunately, examining the relationship between state 
history and political instability faces several challenges arguably due to contradictory evidence 
provided by existing studies in the comparative development literature. 
Therefore, I begin the empirical analysis by analysing a conditional correlation between 
accumulated statehood experience and the degree of uncertainty associated with political systems. 
The study exploits two separate world samples of countries, including European and non-European 
economies. Several interesting patterns are depicted in Figure 1.4 In particular, there exists a 
                                                          
3 It is worth mentioning a recent empirical analysis by Olsson and Paik (2020) demonstrating that an early transition 
to sedentary agriculture has persistent and negative impacts on present-day economic development, measured by 
income per capita. This piece of work is closely related to the literature exploring the long-term legacy of statehood 
experience because the timing of Neolithic revolution is a key determinant of the formation and development of 
historical states (Ang, 2015). The findings of Olsson and Paik (2020) are also in sharp contrast to most previous studies 
arguing that early development exerts a positive influence on today’s economic performance.    
4 The results illustrated in Figure 1 are based on regressing the World Bank’s index of political instability on the state 
history index of Borcan et al. (2018). A set of country-level geographic attributes is incorporated in the regression. 
The results presented in Panel A of Figure 1 also account for unobserved heterogeneity across regions. More details 
are provided Sections 3 and 4. 
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positive association between state history and political instability across non-European societies, 
partialling out the effects of numerous potentially confounding factors (Panel A, Figure 1). Many 
old civilizations outside the European continent (e.g., Egypt, Iran, Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen 
and Sudan) experience high degrees of political instability. By contrast, the level of political 
uncertainty is much lower in many newly established states outside Europe (e.g., New Zealand, 
Costa Rica, Benin and Gabon). These stylized patterns are suggestive of a positive effect of 
statehood experience on political instability across non-European countries. However, state history 
is negatively correlated with political uncertainty within Europe, which reveals that socio-political 
unrest is less likely to proliferate in long-standing European states (Panel B, Figure 1). 
It comes as little surprise that state experience is linked to less political uncertainty across 
European nations. Many scholars argue that the process of state building within the European 
world exerts a positive influence on present-day economic outcomes. The underlying idea is 
straightforward: the state-building process in Europe led to the emergence of modern democratic 
institutions, which play an important role in fostering economic prosperity. Accordingly, the 
history of state building in Europe reveals that rulers were forced to make political concessions in 
order to secure economic resources, held by asset-owning citizens (Tilly, 1975; Bates, 1991; Finer, 
1997; Hariri, 2012). An unintended result of such concessions is the onset of representative 
assemblies (Tilly, 1975; Hariri, 2012). In this context, accumulated state experience improved 
productivity over time by reinforcing institutional innovations. As reviewed by Borcan et al. 
(2018), the onset of innovative institutions in European centralized states resulted in dramatic 
increases in output per capita by fostering private property rights and the accountability of political 
institutions. This provides a modern society with the ability to maintain social order, enforce rules 
and regulations, and allocate vital scare resources efficiently, leading to less political instability. 
By contrast, the absence of democratic institutions in non-European powerful states, characterized 
by strong extractive capacity due to early state development, contributed to economic and 
institutional stagnation (Lagerlöf, 2016; Borcan et al., 2018). Therefore, older and more 
autonomous states outside Europe are characterized by the prevalence of socio-political unrest 
(Panel A, Figure 1). This stylized fact stands in stark contrast to many influential studies in the 
long-term comparative development literature, which document a positive effect of state history 
on present-day economic outcomes (Bockstette et al., 2002; Chanda & Putterman, 2007; 
Putterman & Weil, 2010; Ang, 2013a). 
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Partially motivated by these above stylized patterns, this study attempts to explore the 
relationship between state history and political instability outside the European world. The central 
hypothesis is that accumulated statehood experience is associated with poor-quality institutions 
across non-European societies. The underlying reason builds upon existing studies, which 
document that state history impeded the diffusion of European institutions, starting around the 
sixteenth century (Hariri, 2012; Ertan et al., 2016). Additionally, a long history of statehood is 
linked to the early emergence of powerful elites and entrenched groups within an economy, 
resulting in institutional stagnation (Lagerlöf, 2016; Borcan et al., 2018; Vu, 2021). This may 
translate into persistent and high levels of political uncertainty through undermining the provision 
of public goods and lowering the opportunity cost of engaging in riots and revolts. Exploiting data 
for up to 109 non-European countries, the current study provides strong and robust evidence of a 
positive association between state history and political instability outside Europe. Moreover, it 
finds that non-European societies endowed with a long history of statehood are likely to experience 
the occurrence of riots and revolts. A mediation analysis reveals that the political legacy of early 
state development is partially mediated through income per capita, institutional quality and 
redistribution. In contrast to most previous studies, this paper documents evidence of the negative 
consequences of state history using a sample of non-European economies. Therefore, the results 
help reconcile highly inconclusive findings offered by the existing literature.5 
Furthermore, the current study belongs to an emerging body of research examining the 
“proximate” determinants of political instability. Conventional causes of socio-political unrest 
include, among others, income inequality (Alesina & Perotti, 1996), low levels of income per 
capita, widespread poverty, poor governance (Feng, 1997; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Collier & 
Hoeffler, 2004; Blattman & Miguel, 2010), resource wealth (Dutt & Mitra, 2008), demographic 
characteristics (Goldstone, 2002; Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011; Acemoglu et al., 2020) and trade 
openness (Martin et al., 2008). Nevertheless, the exploitation of these economic and demographic 
factors in the investigation of the deep origins of political instability is unsatisfactory from both 
                                                          
5 An additional motivation for focusing on non-European economies is dictated by the availability of data. This paper, 
therefore, leaves it open for future research to examine the proposed negative relationship between state history and 
political instability within the European continent (Panel B, Figure 1). It is noteworthy that the results illustrated in 
Panel B of Figure 1 do not imply causal inference because they are based on using a limited sample of 34 European 
countries. In this regard, it is difficult to account for alternative explanations when the inclusion of numerous 
confounding factors in the regression significantly reduces the feasible number of degrees of freedom. For this reason, 
this paper exploits a sample of non-European societies with greater data availability. 
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empirical and theoretical perspectives. Empirically, a major concern of credibly causal inference 
stems from reverse causality. This problem arises because political instability has a direct influence 
on its “proximate” determinants.6  By adopting a historical approach, in which I explore the 
contribution of accumulated statehood experience, obtained over six millennia, to explaining 
international differences in political instability, this paper largely circumvents the issue of reverse 
causation. Because current levels of political uncertainty reasonably exert no direct influence on 
the formation and development of historical states, as predetermined thousands of years ago, 
potential endogeneity bias induced by the presence of reverse feedback is broadly ruled out.  
It is important to re-emphasize that political instability appears to be a persistent feature of 
many countries across the world. Figure 2 depicts the evolution of the World Bank’s index of 
political instability within selected countries and regions from 1996 to 2015. It reveals that the 
prevalence of socio-political unrest exhibits high degrees of persistence over time within an 
economy (Panel A, Figure 2). A simple average of political instability constructed for each selected 
region is suggestive of the same time-series pattern (Panel B, Figure 2). It appears that socio-
political unrest may be hard to change once it is present within a society. Therefore, curtailing this 
widespread social issue arguably requires a profound understanding of its fundamental causes 
(Spolaore & Wacziarg, 2013; Nunn, 2020; Vu, 2021). Given the persistence and pervasiveness of 
political instability, the deep origins of riots and revolts may stem from country-level fundamental 
(fixed) characteristics, such as slowly evolving geographic, cultural or historical factors. If political 
instability is fundamentally driven by the formation and development of historical states, 
establishing politically stable economies arguably requires attention to the long shadow of histories 
(Spolaore & Wacziarg, 2013; Nunn, 2020). Unfortunately, few studies exist on the deep-rooted 
determinants of political instability.7 Therefore, this paper sheds light on the vast literature on the 
                                                          
6 For example, an unequal distribution of income can provoke dissatisfaction with the government, possibly leading 
to greater political uncertainty. However, effective leaders of politically unstable economies are likely to adopt 
suboptimal policies arguably because their window of opportunity is short and uncertain. This potentially exacerbates 
within-country income inequality. It is also widely established that political uncertainty exerts a direct influence on 
productivity or income levels, poverty, institutional quality, population growth and trade openness. 
7 Empirical evidence on the deep determinants of political instability is hard to find. An exception is a recent study 
by Grechyna (2018) who highlights the role of geographic characteristics in shaping the prevalence of socio-political 
unrest across countries. Moreover, Depetris-Chauvin (2016) examines the relationship between state history and civil 
conflicts across Sub-Saharan African economies. However, his analysis focuses on a specific region, making it 
difficult to obtain a broad understanding of the long-term political legacy of early state development across the world. 
Importantly, his dependent variable is the onset of civil conflicts, while the main variable of interest of this paper is 
the World Bank’s index of political uncertainty, which reflects the probability of a government collapse. It is 
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causes of political instability through exploiting variation in statehood experience to trace the deep 
historical roots of the worldwide distribution of socio-political unrest. 
Besides the main findings previewed above, this paper finds significant heterogeneity in the 
effects of state history on political instability, using three separate dimension of state formation 
and development. Consistent with the main results, the length of time elapsed since the first 
statehood was recorded is an impediment to establishing politically stable systems outside Europe. 
By contrast, the autonomy of a government and the territorial unity help lower uncertainty 
associated with the political environment. These distinct patterns obtained from decomposing the 
overall state history index have been largely ignored in the long-term comparative development.    
The remainder of the study proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains why non-European 
countries endowed with greater statehood experience tend to suffer from political instability. 
Sections 3 and 4 contain detailed descriptions of data and three key methods of identification. The 
main findings are presented in Section 5, followed by robustness analyses in Section 6. Further 
evidence is discussed in Section 7, and Section 8 concludes.         
2. Statehood experience and the persistence of political instability 
This study proposes that non-European countries endowed with a longer history of statehood are 
more likely to establish politically unstable regimes, compared with newly established states. This 
argument builds upon an emerging body of research documenting two potential conditions that are 
conducive to the prevalence of social and political unrest across the world. 
A key driver of political instability is the opportunity cost of engaging in riots and revolts, 
which can be captured by income or productivity levels (Collier & Sambanis, 2002; Collier & 
Hoeffler, 2004; Blattman & Miguel, 2010; Ang & Gupta, 2018). Therefore, higher income 
corresponds to a greater opportunity cost of participating in socio-political unrest compared with 
that of peaceful cooperation or negotiation, which arguably reduces the pervasiveness of political 
uncertainty. This suggests that low-income countries tend to suffer from greater political instability 
                                                          
noteworthy that there exist numerous studies on the causes and consequences of political instability, besides ones 
focusing on the incidence of violent conflicts. Additionally, there are several attempts at estimating the effects of 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization or polarization on political unrest (see, e.g., Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Nevertheless, the 
degree of population fragmentation is likely to be interrelated with and jointly determined by voluntary or involuntary 
cross-border movements of migrants, partly driven by the prevalence of riots and revolts. Hence, these studies suffer 
from the same theoretical and empirical shortcomings as ones exploring the conventional “proximate” determinants 
of political instability. 
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at least partially because people living in the developing world typically experience a lower 
opportunity cost of participating in violent conflicts. Moreover, widespread poverty and hunger, 
an enduring feature of many developing economies, can act as a catalyst for the onset of violent 
conflicts over scare vital resources, thus shaping international differences in political instability 
(Blattman & Miguel, 2010). It is widely acknowledged that the onset of social and political unrest 
depends on the provision of public goods and redistributive policies within an economy (Arbatlı 
et al., 2020). More specifically, an unequal distribution of income (and/or power) and the under-
provision of public goods may provoke greater dissatisfaction with the government, possibly 
resulting in higher levels of political uncertainty. However, the quality of institutions is a major 
determinant of the provision of public goods and redistributive policies that help lower political 
instability. Therefore, I postulate that state history exerts persistent and positive effects on 
contemporary politically instability outside the European world through shaping reduced 
productivity and poor-quality institutions, as follows. 
First, the central hypothesis of this paper builds upon the existing literature suggesting that 
state history is detrimental to building inclusive institutions across non-European societies, which 
hinder the provision of public goods and income (re)distribution. As such, long-term exposure to 
statehood helps explain the persistence and pervasiveness of political instability outside the 
European world. One of the most influential theories in the long-term comparative development 
literature posits that the historical event of European colonization, starting around the sixteenth 
century, lies at the deep roots of cross-country differences in institutional quality (see, for example, 
Acemoglu et al., 2001; Spolaore & Wacziarg, 2013). It follows from this widely accepted 
hypothesis that European colonizers established different types of institutions outside Europe 
depending on the disease environment of former colonies. This provides an explanation for 
significant inequalities in economic prosperity across non-European nations.8 
Recent contributions to this line of inquiry reveal that precolonial statehood experience plays 
a critical role in mediating the historical diffusion of European institutions (Hariri, 2012; Ertan et 
                                                          
8 Acemoglu et al. (2001) document that places where Europeans could settle permanently are relatively wealthier 
because of well-functioning (inclusive) institutions established by colonial powers. By contrast, Europeans set up 
extractive institutions in countries of which the disease environment prevented the long-term settlement of colonizers. 
The historically established institutions persist until today, thus determining the pattern of economic development 
among European former colonies. Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013) provide a comprehensive survey of related studies 
examining the deep historical roots of comparative cross-country economic development.    
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al., 2016). The basic premise is that the early presence of precolonial state institutions of 
indigenous population constrained the conquest, settlement and institutional transplantation of 
European colonizers. Statehood experience, in particular, conferred a country with an improved 
capacity to consolidate power, which arguably acted as a barrier to a conquest by European powers 
(Ferro, 1997). In precolonial eras, long-standing states were able to mount an organized military 
defence, and developed strong fiscal and administrative capabilities, which increased their ability 
to resist European colonization (Ferro, 1997; Hariri, 2012). Consistent with these arguments, Ertan 
et al. (2016) find evidence that long-term exposure to statehood reduced the probability of having 
been colonized. Additionally, former colonies endowed with a long history of statehood were 
subject to a significantly shorter duration of colonization (Ertan et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, Hariri (2012) establishes that Europeans adopted different strategies of 
colonization depending on the historical depth of experience with state-like polities. Specifically, 
former colonies characterized by early state development tend to have been ruled though the 
existing legal framework and state infrastructure. In places where indigenous state-like institutions 
and infrastructure were already developed for a long time, European colonizers adopted an indirect 
colonial rule that incorporated existing legal-administrative institutions into an overall colonial 
domination (Gerring et al., 2011; Hariri, 2012). Indeed, several influential studies in the long-run 
development literature highlight that an indirect form of colonial rule left former colonies with 
poor governance, ineffective administrations and under-provision of public goods, leading to 
postcolonial underdevelopment (Lange, 2004). However, a direct structure of colonial rule was 
adopted in places lacking long-term exposure to state-level polities (Gerring et al., 2011; Hariri, 
2012). For this reason, statehood experience was an impediment to the diffusion of European ideas 
and institutions. Employing cross-sectional data for non-European countries, Hariri (2012) finds 
that state history exerts a negative influence on the quality of democratic institutions. 
More recently, Borcan et al. (2018), Harish and Paik (2020) and Vu (2021) find that an 
excessive duration of statehood is associated with poor-quality institutions, reduced productivity 
and an unequal distribution of income within an economy. This is mainly attributed to the early 
emergence of powerful elites and entrenched groups with superior economic and political power 
in very long-standing states, leading to an over-centralization of power (Borcan et al., 2018; Harish 
& Paik, 2020; Vu, 2021). The existing literature on the link between state development and 
economic performance reveals that the first state-like polity was established to resolve collective 
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action issues in societies (Olson, 1982, 1986, 1993). In particular, a state above the tribal level 
emerged when “roving bandits” were replaced by “stationary bandits” sustained by taxation rather 
than by plundering (Olson, 1993). However, a long history of historical state development may 
eventually lead to the emergence of powerful elites and entrenched groups within a society (Olson, 
1982, 1986). The rise of these groups may translate into persistent institutional stagnation because 
powerful elites characterized by their economic and political power tend to maximize their 
privileges (private gain) at a cost borne by the rest of the population. Powerful elites are likely to 
establish oppressive regimes to reduce possible expropriation of their privileges, and engage in 
rent-seeking activities (Bentzen et al., 2017; Borcan et al., 2018; Vu, 2021). This also hinders 
progressive (re)distribution of income because entrenched groups within a country tend to 
expropriate tax revenue instead of providing it in the form of public goods and services (Borcan et 
al., 2018; Vu, 2021). 
These narratives explain why very long-standing states typically suffer from institutional 
stagnation and an unequal distribution of income. It is important to re-emphasize that institutional 
quality and income (re)distribution play an important role in shaping the evolution of political 
uncertainty. Well-functioning institutions contribute to establishing politically stable regimes 
through enhancing the provision of public goods, redistributive policies and income levels 
(Blattman & Miguel, 2010). By contrast, poor governance and higher degrees of income inequality 
may provoke riots and revolts via inducing dissatisfaction with the government (Alesina & Perotti, 
1996). Therefore, accumulated statehood experience may translate into persistent political 
instability through shaping institutional stagnation outside the European continent. 
Second, I propose that an early start outside Europe is linked to greater uncertainty associated 
with political regimes through lowering the opportunity cost of engaging in riots and revolts. This 
argument rests upon numerous contributions to the comparative development literature 
demonstrating that a very long history of statehood is associated with reduced productivity. 
Lagerlöf (2016), in particular, develops a theoretical model explaining the global divergence 
in growth trajectories based on variation in long-term exposure to statehood. It argues that 
preindustrial state development became an impediment to the rise of democratic institutions and 
innovation, which are the main drivers of long-term growth. The underlying idea is that very long-
standing states obtained large extractive capacity, thus becoming resistant to transiting to 
democratic statehood. By contrast, rulers of newly established states accumulating less extractive 
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capacity were more inclined to adopt new forms of democratic statehood. Importantly, a transition 
to democratic institutions was associated with an improved capacity to provide growth-enhancing 
public goods, which would eventually translate into sustained innovation-led economic growth. 
Consequently, older and more autonomous states were overcome by younger states, characterized 
by less extractive capacity and more inclusive institutions. The theoretical model advanced by 
Lagerlöf (2016) is suggestive of a negative association between early state development and 
income per capita. More recently, an empirical analysis by Olsson and Paik (2020) indicates that 
an early start is linked to reduced productivity and low levels of income per capita because old 
civilizations established autocratic and hierarchical societies.9 Hence, it is argued that excessive 
statehood experience is associated with poor-quality institutions, which hinder national innovative 
capacity and long-run growth (see, e.g., Lagerlöf, 2016; Borcan et al., 2018; Harish & Paik, 2020; 
Olsson & Paik, 2020; Vu, 2021). For this reason, people living in very long-standing states outside 
Europe may exhibit a lower opportunity cost of engaging in riots and revolts, leading to greater 
political instability. 
Overall, I propose that long-term exposure to state-level institutions is detrimental to 
establishing politically stable regimes outside the European continent. Figure 3 illustrates the main 
hypothesis of the current study. 
3. Data and model specification  
3.1. Empirical framework 
The exploration of the contribution of accumulated statehood experience to explaining the 
persistence and pervasiveness of socio-political unrest outside Europe is mainly based on 
regressing a measure of political instability on the extended state history index. Thus, the paper 
estimates cross-sectional models, following the empirical framework of Bockstette et al. (2002) 
and Borcan et al. (2018). The baseline model specification can be expressed below: 
𝑃𝐼𝑆𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾𝐺𝑒𝑜_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜑𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝐹𝐸𝑖 + 𝑖  [1] 
in which 𝑃𝐼𝑆 is the main dependent variable, capturing cross-country differences in the level of 
political instability. This indicator is constructed using the World Bank’s index of Political 
                                                          
9 Olsson and Paik (2020) argue that the length of time elapsed since the Neolithic revolution is associated with 
underdevelopment, measured by GDP per capita. These findings also build upon the intuition that an early start was 
an impediment to the (historical) emergence of inclusive political institutions, which persist until today and shape 
comparative cross-country development. 
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Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism. The main variable of interest is 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒, which 
stands for the extended state history index of Borcan et al. (2018). It reflects the historical depth 
of experience with statehood, accumulated over a period of six millennia from 3500BCE to 
2000CE. 𝛽 captures the effects of state history on contemporary political instability across 109 
non-European societies (𝑖 = 1,2, … ,109). To avoid omitted variables bias, the benchmark model 
specification accounts for numerous country-level geographic attributes (𝐺𝑒𝑜_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠). They 
include absolute latitude, terrain ruggedness, mean elevation, the range of elevation, mean land 
suitability, the range of land suitability, distance to the nearest waterway, and a dummy for island 
nations (see Section 4). Moreover, I incorporate binary variables for the Word Bank’s regions to 
control for unobserved region-specific factors (𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝐹𝐸). Variables’ descriptions, data sources, 
and summary statistics are provided in the online Appendix.    
3.2. Political instability 
To capture international differences in political instability, this paper exploits the World Bank’s 
index of Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, following Grechyna (2018). The 
construction of this index relies on standardized surveys that reflect respondents’ perceptions of a 
government collapse and the presence of violence. The indicator, therefore, measures the 
probability that a government can be destabilized by contravention of established conventions 
(unconstitutional methods) and/or politically motivated violence, including terrorism. 10  More 
broadly, it reflects perceptions of the probability of riots, revolutions and other forms of violence. 
Higher values of the World Bank’s index correspond to a lower likelihood of a government 
collapse and the absence of violence within an economy. For ease of interpretation, I re-construct 
this index by calculating the difference between the maximum value of the whole sample and each 
country-year value (1996-2015), consistent with the approach of Grechyna (2018). This provides 
a comparable measure of the worldwide distribution of political instability, with higher scores 
denoting greater political uncertainty (Panel A, Figure 4). To estimate cross-sectional models, I 
compute a simple average of this index for 109 countries outside Europe from 1996 to 2015. It is 
noteworthy that the degree of political instability appears to be very stable within an economy over 
time (Figure 2). The results, therefore, are unlikely to be driven by using a simple average of the 
data between 1996 and 2015. Section 7 further explores this possibility by employing repeated 
                                                          
10 The concept of political instability often equates with political uncertainty or political turnover when it refers to the 
likelihood of major changes in the government (Grechyna, 2018).  
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cross-country data on the occurrence of riots and revolts, which may serve as an alternative 
measure of the prevalence of socio-political unrest.   
3.3. Statehood experience 
The historical depth of experience with statehood of each present-day country is measured by the 
extended state history index constructed by Borcan et al. (2018). The method of construction is 
similar to one developed by Bockstette et al. (2002). More specifically, Borcan et al. (2018) exploit 
archaeological data, covering a period of six millennia (3500BCE to 2000CE), to calculate the 







in which 𝑠𝑖𝑡 is the state history score of each present-day country 𝑖 in a given 50-year period 𝑡 
between 3500BCE and 2000CE. 𝑧𝑖𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
 captures the early existence of a state, and it is assigned 
a value of 1 if there existed a government above the tribal level, 0.75 if the government could be 
at best described as a paramount chiefdom, and 0 if there was no government. 𝑧𝑖𝑡
𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦
 reflects 
the autonomy of a state, taking a value of 1 if a country was ruled by an internal government, 0.5 
if it was ruled by a foreign government, and 0.75 if the rule was locally based but with substantial 
foreign oversight. 𝑧𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒
 captures the territorial coverage of a government. It equals 1 if the 
proportion of territories covered by this government was greater than 50%, and 0.75, 0.5, and 0.3 
if the territorial coverage of the government was, respectively, 25-50%, 10-25% and below 10%. 
Next, three different components of state experience are multiplied together and by 50. This yields 
the state history score of each country covering 110 periods of 50 years between 3500BCE and 
2000CE. 




∑ (1 + 𝛿)𝑡−𝜑 × 𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝜑
𝑡=0






 is the overall state history index and it can be computed over different periods 
of time by adjusting the number of 50-year periods (𝜑). I employ the extended state history index 
covering a period of six millennia (3500BCE – 2000CE), dating back to prehistoric times when 
the first statehood was recorded (𝜑 = 110). Alternative periods of statehood can be used for 
comparison and robustness checks. The construction of the overall state history index is performed 
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through calculating the sum of 𝑠𝑖𝑡 across 110 50-year periods. A discount rate of 1% (𝛿 = 0.01) 
is applied to account for the possibility that statehood experience obtained in more recent periods 
has larger effects on contemporary economic development. In other words, smaller weights are 
given to state experience accumulated in the more distant history. Next, these summary values are 
normalized by dividing by their maximum achievable value of 50. Hence, the state history index 
ranges between zero and one, with higher values denoting greater statehood experience. Panel B 
of Figure 4 depicts the international variation in the extended state history index (3500BCE – 
2000CE) of Borcan et al. (2018). 
4. Identification strategy 
A major threat to identifying the causal effects of Statehiste on PIS is potential endogeneity bias 
induced by failure to account for a relevant factor and/or measurement errors in the state history 
index. It is important to note that state history has been typically treated as an exogenous source 
of international variation in contemporary economic performance in most influential studies in the 
long-term comparative development, conditional on accounting for a wide range of possibly 
confounding factors (see, for example, Bockstette et al., 2002; Chanda & Putterman, 2007; 
Putterman & Weil, 2010; Borcan et al., 2018). The underlying argument is that the adoption of a 
historical perspective helps avoid the problem of reverse causality. As argued previously, it is 
implausible to assume that present-day political instability exerts a direct influence on the early 
emergence of historical states, taking place nearly six millennia ago. Therefore, this paper employs 
three alternative strategies of identification to rule out the possibility that the positive relationship 
between state history and political instability outside Europe is exclusively driven by potential 
confounders and/or measurement errors associated with capturing statehood experience.  
4.1. Observed confounding factors 
The first empirical strategy relies on accounting for numerous observed confounders, which is 
consistent with the existing literature (see, e.g., Bockstette et al., 2002; Borcan et al., 2018). 
The study incorporates an extensive set of country-level geographic characteristics in the 
benchmark model. These factors can be correlated with both the historical evolution of states and 
political uncertainty. This approach arguably addresses a concern that the results are merely 
proxies for geographic attributes, which are the key drivers of comparative cross-country 
prosperity. Ang (2015) presents empirical estimates of the impacts of numerous geographic 
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variables on accumulated statehood experience, which partly motivates the choice of main 
geographic control variables. It is widely acknowledged that absolute latitude and distance to the 
nearest waterway help explain substantial variation in economic performance across the globe. 
These two geographic characteristics can exert an influence on the prevalence of socio-political 
unrest through shaping climate, the quality of institutions, income levels and trade-related 
mechanisms (Arbatlı et al., 2020). Following Fearon and Laitin (2003), the paper controls for the 
effects of the ruggedness of terrains. The underlying idea is that rugged terrains may provoke 
greater political uncertainty through providing safe havens for rebels (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). 
Additionally, countries characterized by rough terrains may experience higher degrees of 
population heterogeneity because geographic isolation can be linked to the emergence of numerous 
subgroups within a population (Michalopoulos, 2012). This may worsen political unrest because 
it is more difficult for the government to reconcile large heterogeneity in preferences for public 
goods and redistributive policies (Arbatlı et al., 2020). 
Following the same line of argument, I augment the benchmark analysis by controlling for 
other geographic attributes, which fundamentally drive cross-country differences in political 
instability through affecting ethnolinguistic fractionalization (Michalopoulos, 2012). They include 
mean elevation, the dispersion of elevation, mean land suitability and the dispersion of land 
suitability. An additional concern relates to the possibility that island nations followed different 
(historical) patterns of state formation and development, and the evolution of political unrest due 
to their geographic isolation. Moreover, island countries could be subject to relatively higher levels 
of immunity to cross-border spillovers of violent conflicts (Arbatlı et al., 2020). It is noteworthy 
that countries with a land connection to other nations could benefit from the international 
dissemination of state knowledge and early technologies, thus accumulating greater experience 
with state-like polities (Ang, 2015). Hence, the baseline model specification controls for a binary 
variable for island countries. Region dummies are included in Eq. [1] to account for unobserved 
heterogeneity across regions (e.g., common cultures, histories and other geographic 
characteristics), following the World Bank’s classification (see the notes to Table 1). 
4.2. Selection on observables and unobservables 
The baseline analysis incorporates a variety of geographic characteristics to avoid obtaining 
spurious estimates. Nevertheless, it is impossible to identify all potentially confounding variables 
and control for them in the regression. 
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To find additional support for causal inference, the study implements the coefficient stability 
test advanced by Oster (2019). This method permits a quantitative assessment of the relative 
importance of potentially unobserved confounders required to explain away the observed 
association between state history and political instability. The basic premise is that the degree of 
selection bias attributed to unobserved confounding factors can be detected by the decrease in 
selection bias from incorporating additional observed control variables, as put forward by Altonji 
et al. (2005). As such, it is possible to perform an empirical analysis of the amount of selection on 
unobservables, relative to that on observables, in order to drive the coefficient on Statehiste down 
to zero (Altonji et al., 2005; Oster, 2019). This method is particularly relevant in this context given 
that a key threat to obtaining a causal interpretation from the baseline estimates stems from 
possible failure to incorporate relevant variables in the regression specification. 
Following Oster (2019), an important assumption of the data-generating process can be 
expressed as follows: 
𝑃𝐼𝑆𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝜔𝑋𝑐
𝑜 + 𝜃𝑋𝑐
𝑢 + 𝜖𝑖    [2] 
where 𝑋𝑐
𝑜  denotes a vector of observed control variables, which are geographic controls and 
region dummies included in Eq. [1]. 𝑋𝑐
𝑢 represents a vector of unobserved control variables, and 
𝜖𝑖  stands for the disturbance term. This hypothetical model assumes that the estimate of the 
treatment variable (Statehiste) is determined by both observed confounders (𝑋𝑐
𝑜) and unobserved 
confounders (𝑋𝑐
𝑢 ). Let 𝑊𝑜 = 𝜔𝑋𝑐
𝑜  and 𝑊𝑢 = 𝜃𝑋𝑐








     [3] 
where the delta statistic (𝛿) is the coefficient of proportionality. More specifically, the paper 
considers the 𝛿 value that captures how strong the association between unobserved confounders 
and the treatment variable, relative to that between observed confounders and the treatment 
variable, needs to be in order to easily explain away the estimated effects of state history (𝛽 = 0). 
If the 𝛿 value equals 1, observed and unobserved variables are equally correlated with statehood 
experience, whereas, unobserved confounders are less correlated with state history compared with 
observed confounders if the 𝛿 statistic is less than unity. 
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Assuming that observed and unobserved variables are equally important in accounting for 
the observed association between state history and political instability (𝛿 = 1), Oster (2019) 
demonstrates that 
𝛽∗ = 𝛽 − [?̈? − 𝛽]
𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥−?̃?
?̃?−?̈?
      [4] 
where 𝛽∗  represents the bias-adjusted treatment effect. ?̈?  and ?̈?  denote, respectively, the 
coefficient and the R-squared obtained from regressing PIS on Statehiste without controls. 𝛽 and 
?̃? are, respectively, the coefficient and the R-squared of the regression of PIS on Statehiste with 
full observed controls (𝑋𝑐
𝑜). 𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the R-squared of a hypothetical regression, expressed in Eq. 
[2]. 𝛽∗ reflects the estimated value of the coefficient on Statehiste if unobserved and observed 
confounders are equally related to state history. The construction of the bias-adjusted coefficient 
(𝛽∗) relies on exploiting the movements of coefficients and R-squared values when observed 
control variables are incorporated in the regression. This permits estimating the amount of bias 
induced by unobservables, assuming proportional selection. Employing simulated and 
observational data, Oster (2019) provides strong empirical validation for this estimator. 
Additionally, Oster (2019) recommends using the interval bounded by the estimated coefficient 
on Statehiste and 𝛽∗ to check for robustness to omitted variables bias. If the bounded set safely 
excludes zero, there is evidence against the null hypothesis that the observed association between 
state history and political instability is exclusively driven by selection on unobservables.11   
4.3. Isolating exogenous sources of variation in statehood experience 
A final method of reaching a causal interpretation is based on exploiting plausibly exogenous 
sources of variation in statehood experience that contribute to explaining the worldwide 
distribution of socio-political unrest. This empirical strategy requires identifying a valid 
instrumental variable, which exerts no direct influence on a country’s political instability except 
through shaping the formation and development of historical states. 
To this end, the paper employs the length of time elapsed since the transition to sedentary 
agriculture (Agyears) as an instrument for Statehiste. This approach utilizes the availability of 
anthropological and archaeological evidence documenting that the early existence of sedentary 
                                                          
11 See Oster (2019) for more detailed theoretical and empirical discussions of this method. There are numerous 
empirical studies that adopt the method developed by Oster (2019) as a robustness check for omitted variables bias. 
See, among others, Arbatlı et al. (2020) and Vu (2020). 
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agricultural settlements led to the emergence of a state above the tribal level in prehistoric times 
(Ang, 2015). The first Neolithic revolution was recorded 10,500 years ago in several Middle 
Eastern countries, including Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. These oldest civilizations, included 
in the sample of this paper, were typically subject to early state development. As reviewed by 
Borcan et al. (2018), the first state-like polity emerged around 5000 years ago, preceded by the 
Neolithic revolution throughout the world. There hardly exists any archaeological evidence 
suggesting the presence of a state before the onset of sedentary agricultural settlements (Diamond, 
1997; Ang, 2015). An early contribution by Diamond (1997) suggests that the historical transition 
to sedentary agriculture was a basis for the abundance of food supply, which in turn translated into 
the emergence of the institutionalization of power relations. A possible explanation is that the 
abundance of food supply led to the existence of a non-food producing class that could specialize 
in other activities, such as designing laws and building military forces. This gave rise to the 
emergence and development of statehood. Furthermore, substantial increases in agricultural 
productivity following the Neolithic transition improved the capacity to raise taxes (fiscal 
capabilities) and maintain social order in historical societies. For these reasons, the timing of 
Neolithic revolution is positively correlated with the formation and development of states, which 
points to the relevance of the instrumental variable.12  
The validity of this excluded instrument partially relies on an observation that the onset of 
sedentary agricultural settlements took place independently across the world. Additionally, I argue 
that state history potentially transmits to the persistence of political instability outside Europe 
through undermining the provision of public goods, redistributive policies, and income (or 
productivity) levels (Figure 3). These mechanisms largely rest upon the role of the government in 
providing public goods and designing the institutional framework, or, more broadly, state policies. 
Hence, the timing of the Neolithic revolution plausibly exerts no direct influence on contemporary 
degrees of political uncertainty except through fostering the formation and development of 
historical states. This provides a basis for the plausibility of the exogeneity condition. The IV 
estimates, therefore, permit a causal interpretation at least for the purpose of an alternative strategy 
of identification. 
                                                          
12 Using a cross-country analysis, Ang (2015) shows that the length of time elapsed since the transition to sedentary 
agriculture exerts a strong and robust positive influence on state history, accumulated from 1 to 1950CE. This, at least 
partially, provides evidence of a strong instrument.  
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5. Main findings 
5.1. OLS estimates 
This section presents OLS estimates of the effects of state history on contemporary political 
instability, using a sample of 109 non-European countries. Panel A of Figure 1 depicts the partial 
relationship between statehood experience and political instability outside Europe. It reveals that 
long-standing states are more likely to suffer from the prevalence of riots and revolts, ceteris 
paribus. This is consistent with the main hypothesis that accumulated statehood experience is a 
barrier to establishing politically stable regimes across non-European societies. 
The positive link between state history and political uncertainty can be illustrated by the data 
of two countries in sub-Saharan Africa, namely Ethiopia and Namibia. The early presence of 
sedentary agricultural settlements in Ethiopia, which occurred 4,000 years ago, conferred this very 
old civilization with large accumulated statehood experience through promoting the formation and 
development of state-like polities. The value of the state history index of Ethiopia is approximately 
0.52, which is much higher than of that of Namibia (0.02). More specifically, the difference in 
Statehiste between these two societies is substantial, and it equates to approximately 2.7 standard 
deviations of the extended state history index (3500BCE – 2000CE). This possibly translates into 
significant disparities in the pervasiveness of political instability between these two African 
economies. In particular, Namibia established more politically stable systems than those set up by 
Ethiopia. Namibia experiences a relatively low value of PIS of 1.27, while the PIS score of 
Ethiopia is 3.35. These two countries are separated by approximately 2.5 standard deviations of 
the World Bank’s index of political instability. 
It is important to note that Ethiopia is the only country in sub-Saharan Africa that managed 
to resist colonization arguably due to its long history of state development (Hariri, 2012). However, 
a long duration of state history of Ethiopia is linked to institutional stagnation, reduced productivity 
and the prevalence of socio-political unrest in present times. Consistent with the central argument, 
very old civilizations can be overcome by newly established states in terms of income per capita 
and the quality of institutions, which directly matter for the ability to establish politically stable 
systems. Hence, a long history of statehood appears to be a barrier to maintaining political stability 
outside the European world. This stands in stark contrast to many studies exploring the 
contribution of early state development to international variation in economic prosperity 
(Bockstette et al., 2002; Chanda & Putterman, 2007; Putterman & Weil, 2010; Ang, 2013b).  
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However, it is difficult to obtain a causal interpretation from these stylized facts. Therefore, 
this paper estimates the benchmark model expressed in Eq. [1], controlling for a wide range of 
country-level geographic attributes and unobserved region-specific factors. Table 1 presents the 
OLS estimates of the causal influence of state history on today’s political instability outside 
Europe. The empirical analysis starts with the adoption of the state history index constructed 
between 3500BCE and 1CE, excluding statehood experience obtained in the Common Era (column 
1). The results in column (2) capture the contribution of state experience, accumulated over a 
period before the mass migration of Europeans throughout the world (3500BCE – 1500CE), to the 
global distribution of political instability. In column (3), I employ the extended state history index, 
reflecting long-term exposure to statehood from 3500BCE to 2000CE. 
Following Putterman and Weil (2010), the paper also utilizes an ancestry-adjusted index of 
state history to account for the possibility that statehood experience of present-day countries is 
partially mediated by cross-border migration flows of people. The basic premise is that the 
formation and development of historical states could be affected by movements of people through 
shaping the international diffusion of technologies, state knowledge and capabilities, and the 
quality of institutions. The construction of the ancestry-adjusted state history indicator exploits the 
World Migration Matrix developed by Putterman and Weil (2010). It provides information on the 
estimated percentages by location of the present-day population’s ancestors in 1500CE. For 
instance, the World Migration Matrix allows tracing where the ancestors of India were living in 
1500CE. Accordingly, 97.9%, 1% and 1.1% of the current population of India descended from 
India, Bangladesh and Pakistan, respectively. The ancestry-adjusted index of statehood experience 
of India is a weighted average of state history scores of these three source countries, in which the 
weights correspond to population ancestral proportions. This permits an assessment of whether the 
observed relationship between state history and political instability outside Europe is exclusively 
driven by historical migration flows. 
It is evident from the benchmark findings that the estimated coefficients of Statehiste are 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in all cases (Table 1). The results reveal that 
non-European societies characterized by a longer history of state experience tend to suffer from 
higher degrees of political instability, holding everything else constant. The positive association 
between state history and political uncertainty is robust to accounting for numerous geographic 
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characteristics and unobserved heterogeneity across regions.13 This lends empirical support to the 
main hypothesis that a long history of statehood is associated with greater political instability 
outside Europe. This finding offers novel insights into the strand of literature exploring the 
contribution of early state development to explaining substantial variation in economic prosperity 
across the world. The study, in particular, documents evidence of the negative consequences of 
early state development outside the European world. As argued earlier, a possible explanation is 
that accumulated statehood experience impeded the diffusion of European (democratic) 
institutions, thus worsening the quality of institutions of present-day countries (Hariri, 2012). 
Moreover, long-standing states are characterized by the emergence of powerful elites and 
entrenched groups, leading to institutional and productivity stagnation (Lagerlöf, 2016; Borcan et 
al., 2018; Olsson & Paik, 2020; Vu, 2021). Hence, socio-political unrest tends to proliferate in old 
and autonomous states outside Europe (Figure 3). My results provide some support for recent 
studies documenting the negative impacts of early development on present-day economic 
performance (Lagerlöf, 2016; Borcan et al., 2018; Olsson & Paik, 2020; Vu, 2021). 
The size of the estimated coefficients decreases marginally from columns (1) to (4) of Table 
1. Figure 5 illustrates the variation in the point estimate and the 95% confidence interval of the 
coefficients on Statehiste when exploiting different periods of statehood experience. Accordingly, 
the largest estimated effect is recorded in the model specification that incorporates statehood 
experience obtained from 3500BCE to 1CE (column 1). The magnitude of the coefficient reduces 
when the construction of the state history index considers state experience accumulated in the 
Common Era, as shown in columns (2) and (3) and Figure 5. The last column of Table 1 adjusts 
for the persistent effects of (historical) cross-border movements of people. It is important to re-
highlight that the oldest state-like polities emerged around 5000 years ago outside the European 
world (Borcan et al., 2018). These long-standing states also suffer from the persistence and 
pervasiveness of socio-political unrest in modern times. Therefore, an explicit focus on statehood 
experience obtained before the Common Era produces quantitatively larger impacts of state history 
                                                          
13 Drawing reliable inference on the baseline OLS estimates requires some attention to the statistical adequacy of the 
model. I report the results of Ramsey’s RESET test of functional form misspecification in Table 1, which are 
suggestive of correctly specified models. Additionally, the paper checks for the normal distribution of the disturbance 
terms, using Doornik-Hansen’s Normality test. The results reveal the normality assumption of the data is not violated. 
These results, at least to some extent, lend credence to reliable statistical inference. See also the notes to Table 1.     
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on contemporary political instability. This reinforces the central hypothesis that early emergence 
of state-like polities is detrimental to building politically stable regimes outside Europe. 
Following Borcan et al. (2018), I employ the extended state history index (3500BCE – 
2000CE) in the main analysis because it reflects state experience obtained over a prolonged period 
of six millennia (since the first statehood was recorded). However, I obtain broadly similar results 
in columns (2) to (4). This reveals that the results are insensitive to accounting for (historical) 
migration flows across the world, starting from the sixteenth century. More specifically, the 
exclusion of state experience obtained from 1500CE to 200CE fails to alter the core results 
(column 2). The use of an ancestry-adjusted measure of state history slightly reduces the magnitude 
of the coefficient on Statehiste, but the effects are still precisely estimated at conventional levels 
of significance (column 4). Therefore, the paper selects the estimated results in columns (3) and 
(4) as the benchmark findings, which are exploited to conduct numerous robustness checks later. 
For ease of comparison, I replicate the main results by using the original state history index 
of Bockstette et al. (2002), which captures statehood experience obtained from 1 to 1950CE. 
Figure 5 depicts the point estimate and 95% confidence interval of the coefficient of Statehiste (1-
1950CE).14 As noted by Borcan et al. (2018), the indicator constructed by Bockstette et al. (2002) 
disregards the early presence of many old and autonomous states before the Common Era. As such, 
the results may suffer from potential bias induced by measurement errors in the state history index. 
In particular, the coefficient of Statehiste reduces by more than a half when statehood experience 
obtained before the Common Era is not taken into consideration (Figure 5). This is in line the 
findings of Borcan et al. (2018) who propose the use of an extended measure of state history. 
It is noteworthy that accumulated statehood experience also exerts an economically 
significant influence on present-day political instability. More specifically, the results in column 
(3) indicate that a 0.2-unit increase (approximately an extra standard deviation) in Statehiste is 
associated with a 0.3-unit increase in PIS, which equates to just below a half of a standard deviation 
of the World Bank’s index of political instability (0.829). As discussed above, the state history 
index of Ethiopia and Namibia is 0.52 and 0.02, respectively. The baseline estimates suggest that 
if Namibia instead experienced a score of the state history index similar to that of Ethiopia, the 
predicted increase in the political instability index of Namibia would equate to roughly 0.751 units. 
                                                          
14 The full results, not reported for brevity, are available on request. 
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This projected increase is slightly smaller than a standard deviation of PIS. Overall, this paper 
documents that statehood experience has strong and robust effects on contemporary political 
instability outside the European continent. 
Furthermore, the paper finds that several country-level geographic characteristics contribute 
to the worldwide distribution of political instability. As presented in Table 1, societies located 
further away from the equator tend to establish politically stable systems. The coefficient of 
Absolute latitude is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. Moreover, Distance to 
the nearest waterway is associated with greater political instability. These findings are consistent 
with previous studies documenting that riots and revolts tend to proliferate in tropical and isolated 
countries, which can be explained by climatological, institutional and trade-related mechanisms 
(see Arbatlı et al., 2020). I also find that rugged terrains exert a positive and statistically significant 
influence on political instability at the 1% level (Table 1). This lends support to the argument that 
Terrain ruggedness may induce greater fractionalization within a society, making it difficult to 
build up politically stable regimes. Consistent with these results, the paper documents that the 
dispersions of land suitability for agriculture and elevation are linked to greater political 
uncertainty through shaping ethnic fractionalization (Michalopoulos, 2012). In contrast to 
Michalopoulos (2012), Mean elevation is found to lower political instability. A recent study by Vu 
(2021) reveals that the mean level of elevation is associated with an unequal distribution of income 
arguably due to its potential effects on linguistic diversity. Nevertheless, my findings are 
suggestive of the positive effects of mean elevation on economic development, controlling for the 
intra-country dispersion of elevation and the ruggedness of terrains. As expected, a dummy 
variable for island nations enters the four main model specifications with a negative coefficient. 
Hence, island countries may suffer from less political instability compared with those 
characterized by a land connection with other countries. However, these estimated impacts are 
highly imprecise and not statistically significant at conventional thresholds (Table 1).   
5.2. Addressing possible endogeneity concerns 
The OLS estimates provide evidence that non-European countries characterized by a long history 
of statehood are likely to experience greater political instability. The findings remain insensitive 
to accounting for a wide range of geographic variables and unobserved region-specific factors. 
These results, at least partially, suggest that the observed association between state history and 
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political instability may not be purely driven by the conventional fundamental causes of 
comparative cross-country development.  
This sub-section further reduces the possibility of obtaining spurious estimates, induced by 
possible omitted variables bias, through adopting the coefficient stability test of Oster (2019), 
discussed in Section 4. I perform this empirical exercise using the baseline OLS estimates, and 
report the results in Table 2. I calculate the 𝛿  statistic using different periods of statehood 
experience (column 3, Table 2). More specifically, a value of 4.3 of the 𝛿 statistic, obtained from 
using an ancestry-adjusted measure of state experience, indicates that the correlation of unobserved 
confounders with Statehiste is required to be more than four times as large as that of observed 
confounders in order to result in the baseline estimates being indistinguishable from zero. 
Moreover, Oster (2019) reveals that the results are not exclusively driven by selection on 
unobservables if the 𝛿 statistic is greater than unity. As shown in column (3) of Table 2, the 𝛿 
statistic exceeds this threshold in all cases. These results suggest that selection on unobserved 
factors needs to be unreasonably strong to account for the benchmark findings, thus providing 
evidence of robustness of the results to omitted variables bias. 
Assuming that unobserved and observed variables are equally important in explaining the 
main hypothesis, I construct the bias-adjusted coefficient 𝛽∗ (column 2, Table 2). In all cases, the 
interval bounded by the main coefficient and 𝛽∗ safely excludes zero. Hence, one can reject the 
null hypothesis that the political legacy of state history is exclusively driven by the effects of 
potential unobserved confounders. It is challenging to identify and incorporate all confounding 
factors in standard regression analysis. However, the paper provides an assessment of the relative 
importance of unobserved variables, suggesting that they cannot easily explain away the observed 
association between state history and political uncertainty outside the European world. 
An additional attempt at obtaining causal inference relies on using plausibly exogenous 
sources of variation in the formation and development of historical states. Consistent with my 
previous arguments, I employ the length of time elapsed since the transition to sedentary 
agriculture (Agyears) to perform IV regressions (Table 3). According to the first-stage estimates, 
Agyears has positive and statistically significant effects on accumulated statehood experience, in 
line with the findings of Ang (2015). The early emergence of sedentary agricultural settlements 
helps explain cross-country differences in state experience, thus lending support to relevance of 
the instrument (Figure 6). The F-statistic of excluded instruments of Olea and Pflueger (2013) is 
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also much larger than the conventional threshold of 10. This reveals that Agyears is not a weak 
instrument.15 As shown in the second-stage regression, the plausibly exogenous component of 
Statehiste exerts positive impacts on contemporary political instability. The effects are precisely 
estimated at conventional levels of statistical significance in all cases. Overall, the IV results are 
broadly consistent with the OLS estimates. To check whether the IV estimates are driven by weak 
instrument bias, I report identification-robust Anderson-Rubin confidence intervals, all of which 
safely exclude zero. This permits an interpretation of statistically significant effects of Statehiste 
on PIS. Andrews et al. (2019) demonstrate that these results are efficient irrespective of the 
strength of the excluded instrument in the first-stage regression. 
It is noteworthy that the magnitude of the coefficients of Statehiste, reported in Table 3, turns 
out to be much larger than that of the OLS estimates. This can be attributed to the persistence of 
socio-political unrest in prehistoric times (Arbatlı et al., 2020). The OLS estimates can suffer from 
a downward bias if the early presence of riots can reduce the ability to obtain statehood experience. 
Additionally, I assume earlier that cross-border movements of people starting in 1500CE, 
especially to the New World, can confound my results. This concern is partly addressed by 
adjusting for the ancestral composition of the population of present-day countries and excluding 
statehood experience obtained from 1500CE to 2000CE (columns 2 and 4, Table 1). However, 
migration flows can affect current economic performance through human capital, socio-political 
institutions, and other unobserved mechanisms (Arbatlı et al., 2020). The OLS estimates can be 
attenuated if these channels, which may not be captured by the ancestral composition of the current 
population, affect the ability to maintain a politically stable environment. However, the IV 
estimates indicate that the extent to which state history contributes to international variation in 
present-day political instability is even more economically significant. 
There exists no perfect strategy for identifying the causal effects of state history on political 
uncertainty. This study, therefore, adopts different alternative methods of identification. All of 
them, reassuringly, provide robust evidence of the economic and statistical significance of the 
political legacy of early state development outside Europe, thus permitting causal inference. The 
following section employs both the OLS and IV estimates reported in the last two columns of 
Tables 1 and 3 to perform a variety of robustness analyses to avoid obtaining spurious estimates.        
                                                          
15 As suggested by Andrews et al. (2019), the effective F-statistic of Olea and Pflueger (2013) provides a valid basis 
for inference on weak instruments even when adopting non-homoscedastic, clustered and autocorrelated data.  
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6. Sensitivity checks 
6.1. Robustness to controlling for other effects 
This section replicates the main analysis by controlling for a wide range of potentially confounding 
factors. This reduces the possibility that the results are exclusively attributed to conventional 
explanations of international differences in political instability. 
First, the central hypothesis suggests that long-term exposure to statehood may translate into 
the persistence of political uncertainty outside Europe through shaping the opportunity cost of 
engaging in riots, the quality of institutions, the provision of public goods and redistributive 
policies. One may well argue that the main findings are merely proxies for these factors. I contend 
that this assumption is implausible for several reasons. The inclusion of these variables in the 
regression fails to drive the results down to zero (Table 4). 16  Moreover, these factors are 
interrelated with and jointly determined by political instability, leading to reverse causality bias. 
For this reason, they are excluded from the benchmark model specification. Importantly, Acharya 
et al. (2016) reveal that empirical estimates can be biased if the baseline regression incorporates 
potential channels underlying the relationship between Statehiste and PIS.17 However, the results 
reported in Table 4 suggest that my findings are not purely driven by failure to control for 
potentially mediating variables. 
Second, I account for the confounding effects of population diversity in Table 5. It is widely 
acknowledged that population diversity, captured by ethnolinguistic fractionalization or 
polarization, is a barrier to establishing politically stable regimes (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Blattman 
& Miguel, 2010). Countries characterized by the presence of numerous subgroups may suffer from 
mistrust and the under-provision of public goods, leading to greater political uncertainty. More 
recently, Arbatlı et al. (2020) find that heterogeneity in the composition of genetic traits, which 
captures interpersonal population diversity, is associated with the onset of civil conflicts. Hence, I 
re-estimate the benchmark model by controlling for different measures of population diversity 
(Table 5). However, the OLS and IV estimates retain their signs and significance levels in all cases. 
                                                          
16 As shown in Table 4, I control for the log of income per capita (Lgdppc), which reflects the opportunity cost of 
engaging in socio-political unrest. The World Bank’s index of control of corruption, a commonly used proxy for 
institutional quality (Institutions), is also included in the baseline model. I attempt to capture the provision of public 
goods and income redistribution through using an index of the relative difference between inequality of market and 
disposable income (Redist). The online Appendix contains detailed descriptions of variables. See also Section 7.  
17 Section 7 contains a more rigorous analysis of the role of these variables in mediating the benchmark findings. 
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Finally, Table 6 replicates the main analysis by accounting for other factors shaping the 
international variation in political instability.18 Alesina and Perotti (1996) find that an unequal 
distribution of income is a key determinant of riots and revolts. This motivates the inclusion of an 
index of disposable income inequality in column (1). It is argued that countries with lower levels 
of social capital may suffer from the persistence of conflicts and political uncertainty. Thus, the 
baseline model incorporates a measure of social capital (column 2).19 In column (3), I control for 
the effects of resource wealth through including four indicators of resource endowments (oil, gas, 
mineral and forest rents) in the regression (see, e.g., Dutt & Mitra, 2008). Following Krieger and 
Meierrieks (2011), the paper checks for robustness to accounting for democratic institutions. My 
findings can be confounded by country-level demographic characteristics, as suggested by 
Acemoglu et al. (2020). Hence, I incorporate population density and the size of population in 
column (5). The last three columns account for the political legacy of trade openness, urbanization 
and religions (Martin et al., 2008). The positive relationship between Statehiste and PIS outside 
Europe retains its statistical significance in all cases. For this reason, the core findings are unlikely 
to be easily explained away by other effects.      
6.2. Robustness to the plausibility of the exogeneity condition 
The credibility of the orthogonality requirement provides a valid basis for statistical inference 
based on the IV estimates. The narrative presented in Section 4 suggests that Agyears is unlikely 
to transmit directly to the persistence of present-day political instability except through its effects 
on accumulated statehood experience. Unfortunately, attempts at empirical justification of 
exclusion restrictions are challenging due to the unobserved nature of the error components. My 
previous results indicate that the IV estimates retain their signs and statistical significance when 
accounting for a wide range of potentially confounding factors. To the extent that Agyears affects 
contemporary political instability through shaping conventional causes of riots and revolts, the 
exogeneity requirement is satisfied upon allowing them to enter the model specification. To find 
additional support for the exogeneity condition, this paper employs an alternative excluded 
instrument for Statehiste, and performs a test of over-identifying restrictions. 
                                                          
18 The estimated coefficients of additional controls included in Table 6 are omitted for brevity. However, they are 
available on request. 
19 It is important to note that data on social capital, constructed using the Word Values Survey, are sparse across 
countries. This prevents conducting a comparable replication of the core findings. However, the baseline estimates 
remain statistically significant at conventional levels even when estimating a more restricted sample.  
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Pursuing this strategy requires isolating at least one additional source of variation in state 
history because the baseline model is exactly identified. The empirical analysis is motivated by 
Vu (2021) who identifies the causal influence of state history on within-country income inequality 
using geographic distance to the regional leaders in 1000BCE (Proximity) as a valid instrument 
for state experience.20 The basic intuition is that countries located near the regional frontiers in 
1000BCE, which were areas with the highest level of development in prehistoric times, could 
benefit from the spillovers of state knowledge and technologies, and socio-economic interactions. 
This is conducive to the early emergence of state-like polities. Using a cross-country analysis, Ang 
(2015) finds that Proximity is strongly correlated with the formation and development of states. In 
line with these results, Vu (2021) documents a positive relationship between Proximity and the 
extended state history index of Borcan et al. (2018). Hence, Proximity may be a relevant instrument 
for statehood experience. Furthermore, Vu (2021) highlights that the advantage of being proximate 
to the regional leaders in 1000BCE has no direct effect on current economic performance. The 
basic idea is that most regional leaders are no longer frontiers of economic development in modern 
times. This suggests that Proximity may not directly affect current economic development.21 
Table 7 reports the estimation results when using Proximity as an alternative instrument. The 
signs and significance levels of the IV estimates withstand this empirical exercise. Diagnostic tests 
and the first-stage estimates lend support to relevance of this additional excluded instrument, in 
line with the findings of Ang (2015) and Vu (2021) (Table 5). Importantly, it is evident from p-
values of the test of over-identifying restrictions that the null hypothesis underlying the validity of 
additional instruments is not rejected at conventionally accepted levels of significance (columns 2 
and 4, Table 7). This, at least to some extent, provides suggestive evidence of the validity of the 
exogeneity condition. Hence, the main IV estimates reasonably provide a valid basis for obtaining 
a causal interpretation.   
                                                          
20 As put forward by Ang (2015), the regional leaders for each continent are societies with the largest urban settlements 
in 1000BCE. The basic premise is that only developed societies in prehistoric times were able to afford dense 
population. Exploiting historical data, Ang (2015) develops a measure of geographic proximity between a given 
country and the regional leaders based on the Haversine formula. Countries with higher values of Proximity are 
geographically close to the regional leaders in 1000BCE, thus driving the early emergence of state-like polities.   
21 Most regional leaders in 1000BCE, as identified by Ang (2015), have ceased to exist as the world leaders of 
technologies in present times. For this reason, the advantage of being proximate to a regional frontier in 1000BCE is 
relevant for the formation and development of historical states, but Proximity is unlikely to affect current economic 
development through shaping the spillovers of modern technologies and institutions. See also Ang (2015) and Vu 
(2021) for a more detailed discussion.  
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6.3. Additional robustness tests 
To conserve space, the paper provides a more detailed discussion of other sensitivity analyses in 
the online Appendix; here I present an overview of the results. Specifically, performing numerous 
additional robustness checks demonstrates that the contribution of early state development to 
contemporary political instability across non-European societies is largely insensitive to (1) 
applying various discount rates to distant periods in the measurement of the state history index; 
(2) accounting for possible spatial dependence of statehood experience and socio-political unrest; 
(3) considering the role of potential outliers; (4) excluding different specific groups of countries; 
and (5) checking for the presence of a non-monotonic relationship.    
7. Further analyses 
7.1. State history and the occurrence of socio-political unrest 
Exploiting repeated cross-country data, this section extends the baseline analysis by examining the 
relationship between accumulated statehood experience and the incidence of social and political 
unrest. From a conceptual perspective, this empirical exercise investigates the extent to which 
long-term exposure to statehood hinders the establishment of politically stable systems by 
provoking the prevalence of socio-political unrest within an economy. To this end, the paper 
utilizes a dichotomous measure of unrest, constructed by Acemoglu et al. (2019). This indicator, 
in particular, captures the occurrence of riots and revolts on an annual basis between 1960 and 
2010 across countries. 
Following the empirical framework of Arbatlı et al. (2020), I specify the following probit 
model, which is estimated using annual repeated cross-country data. 
𝑈𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑈𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡   [5] 
where 𝑈𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 is binary variable measuring the occurrence of riots and revolts for country i in 
year t from 1960 to 2010. The time period is dictated by the availability of data provided by 
Acemoglu et al. (2019). 𝑈𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1  is the lagged occurrence of unrest, which captures the 
persistence of socio-political unrest. It is assumed that the probability of observing the incidence 
of unrest in a given year is higher in countries with an experience of riots and revolts in the previous 
year. The model incorporates numerous time-invariant variables. They include the state history 
index (Statehiste) and a set of geographic controls and region dummies (𝑋𝑖), which are similar to 
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those included in Eq. [1]. 𝛿𝑡  denotes a vector of year dummies that account for unobserved 
heterogeneity over time. 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 represents the error term. 
The paper adopts similar empirical strategies implemented in the main analysis to estimate 
Eq. [5]. Table 8 reports the probit and IV probit estimates of the effects of state history on the 
occurrence of riots and revolts. In all regressions, the analysis accounts for country-level 
geographic attributes, unobserved heterogeneity across regions and over years, and the persistence 
of socio-political unrest. As represented in Table 8, Statehiste enters all probit model specifications 
with a positive coefficient. The estimated effects of statehood experience on the incidence of unrest 
remain highly precise at the 1% level of significance (Table 8). It suggests that non-European 
societies endowed with a long history of statehood are more likely to experience the annual 
incidence of riots and revolts, leading to greater political instability. These findings extend the 
main analysis by documenting evidence that state history is associated with the persistence and 
pervasiveness of political instability outside the European continent via triggering the occurrence 
of riots and revolts.             
7.2. Heterogeneity in the political legacy of different statehood components 
The benchmark analysis exploits a summary measure of statehood experience, which incorporates 
three distinct aspects of state formation and development (Section 3). In this sub-section, the study 
investigates the possibility that three dimensions of state history exert heterogeneous impacts on 
contemporary political instability outside the European continent. Hence, I re-estimate the 
benchmark model using those three components of state experience. They include Stage age (the 
length of time elapsed since the first statehood was recorded), State autonomy (the degree to which 
the rule was internally based), and State coverage (the state’s territorial unity).22 
Table 9 reports empirical estimates of the heterogeneous political legacy of three 
components of statehood. It is evident from both the OLS and IV estimates that State age is 
associated with higher levels of political instability, consistent with the main hypothesis (Figure 
3). In particular, State age enters all model specifications with a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient (Table 9). This lends credence to the baseline results arguing that the 
emergence of historical states leads to political instability possibly through giving rise to powerful 
                                                          
22 See the online Appendix for a detailed description of these variables. 
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elites and institutional stagnation within a society.23 Nevertheless, the study provides evidence 
that State autonomy and Stage coverage help lower the level of political instability. The estimated 
coefficients of these variables are negative in all cases, although the statistical significance of the 
point estimate varies considerably between the OLS and IV estimates (Table 9). When I include 
all three variable in one single OLS regression, the coefficients on State autonomy and State 
coverage turn out to be imprecisely estimated at conventional levels of significance (column 4, 
Table 9). The robustness of the coefficient on Stage age suggests that the main findings are largely 
driven by the early presence of a state above the tribal level. 
Importantly, the results in Table 9 reveal that having experienced the early existence of state-
like polities is a barrier to establishing politically stable regimes. By contrast, having experienced 
the rule of an internally based government (instead of being part of a foreign ruled empire) and 
having experienced territorial completeness (or unity) help lower uncertainty associated with the 
political environment of non-European societies in modern times. To my knowledge, possible 
heterogeneity in the degree to which accumulated statehood experience helps shape the worldwide 
distribution of economic prosperity has been largely unexplored in most previous studies in the 
long-term comparative development literature.          
7.3. Potentially mediating mechanisms 
As depicted in Figure 3, the positive link between Statehiste and PIS outside Europe can be 
mediated through several mechanisms. For instance, the study proposes that long-term exposure 
to statehood is linked to institutional stagnation of present-day countries. Poor-quality institutions 
eventually hinder establishing politically stable systems through lowering productivity and income 
levels (Section 2).24 Additionally, poor governance impedes the provision of public goods or 
redistributive policies. These potentially mediating variables are included in Table 4, which fails 
to alter the main findings. Motivated by a recent study by Acharya et al. (2016), this sub-section 
provides a more rigorous analysis of possible mechanisms underlying the benchmark findings, 
including Lgdppc, Institutions and Redist. The online Appendix provides a detailed description of 
these variables. It is noteworthy the provision of public goods and/or redistributive policies are 
                                                          
23 These results offer an additional interpretation of variation in the point estimate of the coefficient on Statehiste in 
Table 1, which is illustrated in Figure 5. They demonstrate that older civilizations outside Europe tend to suffer from 
the persistence and pervasiveness of political uncertainty. 
24 As discussed previously, income per capita arguably captures the opportunity cost of engaging in riots and revolts, 
which represents an important mechanism of transmission.  
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commonly measured by public expenditure on health or education. Such metrics, however, may 
not reflect progressive redistribution of income if they disproportionately benefit middle- and 
upper-income groups of society, particularly in the developing world (Milanovic, 2000). Hence, I 
employ Redist, which reflects the relative difference between inequality of net and market income, 
using the Standardized World Income Inequality database.25 
A conventional empirical strategy relies on incorporating potentially mediating variables in 
the baseline analysis to check for the role of proposed mechanisms in explaining the observed 
relationship. Nonetheless, Acharya et al. (2016) argue that the inclusion of channels of 
transmission (e.g., Institutions) and the treatment variable (Statehiste) in one regression 
specification leads to biased estimates arguably due to mediating variables bias.26 To address this 
concern, Acharya et al. (2016) recommend implementing a two-step regression procedure, which 
provides reliable inference on potential mechanisms of influence. Following this method, the 
current study performs a mediation analysis to capture the average controlled direct effects 
(ACDE) of Statehiste on PIS. The ACDE estimates reflect the contribution of accumulated 
statehood experience to contemporary political instability outside Europe after ruling out the 
effects of possibly mediating mechanisms. 
Specifically, the first-step analysis involves regressing the outcome variable (PIS) on the 
treatment variable (Statehiste), potential mediators, and main control variables (geographic 
controls and region dummies). Exploiting the first-step estimates, the paper transforms the 
outcome variable by subtracting the effect of the mediating variable. In the second-step regression, 
the demediated outcome variable is regressed on the treatment, yielding ACDE estimates.27 One 
may plausibly conclude that the impacts of state history on political instability are mainly mediated 
through the proposed mechanism if the ACDE estimates are indistinguishable from zero. By 
contrast, it is possible that the degree to which the treatment variable matters for the outcome 
variable is mediated through other pathways in addition to the proposed mechanism if the ACDE 
                                                          
25 The adoption of health or education expenditure produces broadly similar findings. These results are not reported 
for brevity, but are available on request. Redist is constructed by the difference between the Gini coefficient of 
inequality of market income and disposable income (as a proportion of inequality of market income). Higher values 
reflect the government’s greater efforts to provide public goods and redistributive policies. 
26 Acharya et al. (2016) present a detailed discussion on the extent of bias induced by simultaneously controlling for 
the treatment variable and the proposed mediating variables. 
27 A bootstrapping method is used to produce consistent estimates, as shown in the notes to Table 10. 
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estimates remain highly precise at conventional levels of statistical significance (see Acharya et 
al., 2016 for more details). 
The OLS estimates of the effects of state history on political uncertainty remain statistically 
significant at the 5% level in most cases after I rule out the effects of possibly mediating variables 
(Panel A, Table 10). This reflects a reduction in the precision of the point estimate of the 
coefficients on Statehiste, compared with those reported in Table 1. When exploiting a plausibly 
exogenous source of variation in state experience, the ACDE estimates turn out to be statistically 
insignificant at conventional thresholds in some cases (Panel B, Table 10). These patterns reveal 
that the causal influence of statehood experience on political instability is partially mediated 
through several proposed mechanisms, including institutional quality, income per capita (or 
productivity) and income redistribution (Acharya et al., 2016). These results provide some 
suggestive evidence of the main hypothesis articulated in Section 2 (Figure 3). 
8. Concluding remarks 
This study attempts to identify the deep historical roots of political instability. It highlights the role 
of statehood experience in shaping the persistence and pervasiveness of socio-political unrest 
outside the European world. In contrast to numerous influential studies documenting the beneficial 
effects of state history on economic development, the current paper establishes that long-term 
exposure to statehood, obtained over six millennia, is a barrier to creating politically stable 
economies across non-European societies. The results, therefore, provide novel insights into the 
existing literature by demonstrating the negative consequences of early state development. 
The paper also advances a central line of inquiry in economics that attempts to understand 
the causes of political instability. It goes beyond previous studies by providing suggestive evidence 
that contemporary political instability can be linked to the formation and development of historical 
states. By doing so, the current research is the first attempt to identify the deeply rooted historical 
factors behind the persistence and pervasiveness of riots and revolts. It follows from my findings 
that the political legacy of historical states should be taken into consideration when formulating 
policies that help curtail the prevalence of socio-political unrest. Moreover, the main results 
suggest that riots and revolts tend to persist in long-standing states outside Europe, which is at 
least partially attributed to a long history of statehood. Hence, policy-makers should take a long-
term perspective in understanding the evolution of political instability. Importantly, the efficacy 
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of today’s policies arguably requires being compatible with the prevailing historical environment 
(Spolaore & Wacziarg, 2013; Nunn, 2020). 
Employing data for 109 non-European societies, I provide strong and robust evidence of a 
positive relationship between state history (3500BCE – 2000CE) and present-day political 
instability. To obtain a causal interpretation from the empirical estimates, the study employs 
alternative strategies of identification, yielding remarkably similar findings. Moreover, the 
baseline results withstand numerous sensitivity checks. Further analyses using repeated cross-
country data suggest that a long history of statehood is associated with the occurrence of riots and 
revolts outside the European continent. A replication of the main results that relies on decomposing 
the overall state history index reveals some novel findings. Specifically, I find that the length time 
elapsed since the first statehood was recorded is detrimental to establishing politically stable 
regimes, while the autonomy and territorial unity of historical states contribute to political stability. 
These heterogeneous patterns have been largely overlooked in previous studies exploring the 
impacts of early state development on economic performance. It is evident that the early existence 
of a state above the tribal level has negative long-term consequences on current economic 
development via inducing greater uncertainty associated with the political environment. By 
contrast, having been ruled by an independent (internally based) empire and having experienced 
territorial completeness contribute to economic prosperity through lowering political instability. 
The current research proposes several possible mechanisms underlying the positive 
relationship between state history and political instability outside Europe (Figure 3). In particular, 
a long history of statehood is linked to institutional stagnation through impeding the diffusion of 
European institutions starting around the sixteenth century. Moreover, powerful elites and 
entrenched groups tend to proliferate in old civilizations. Consequently, poor-quality institutions 
translate into the persistence of political uncertainty via hindering the provision of public goods or 
redistributive policies, and lowering income or productivity levels (Figure 3). Using a mediation 
analysis developed by Acharya et al. (2016), the study provides some evidence that the degree to 
which state history matters for current political instability is at least partially mediated through 
income per capita, the quality of institutions and the government’s efforts to provide public goods 
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Figure 1. The relationship between state history and political instability 
Notes: This figure illustrates the effects of statehood experience on political instability across the world, 
partialling out the effects of geographic attributes and unobserved region-specific factors. Statehood 
experience is captured by the extended state history index constructed by Borcan et al. (2018), with higher 
values reflecting greater statehood experience. Political instability is constructed using the World Bank’s 
index of Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, with higher values corresponding to greater 




Figure 2. The evolution of political instability within selected countries and regions 
Notes: This figure depicts the variation in the World Bank’s index of political instability from 1996 to 2015. 
Panel A presents the data of six selected countries endowed with high, intermediate and low degrees of 




Figure 3. The hypothesized effects of statehood experience on political instability 
Notes: This figure depicts the central hypothesis linking accumulated statehood experience and contemporary political instability. More specifically, 
state history impeded the diffusion of European institutions, and could give rise to powerful elites and entrenched groups within an economy. Thus, 
a long history of statehood is associated with institutional stagnation. Poor-quality institutions eventually translate into persistent political uncertainty 
through hindering the provision of public goods (or redistributive policies) and income levels. ( – ) and ( + ) denote positive and negative effects, 





Figure 4. Cross-country differences in political instability and state history 
Notes: This figure depicts the worldwide distribution of political instability and statehood experience. Data 
on political instability are averaged across the period 1996 – 2015. See the notes to Figure 1 and the main 





Figure 5. The effects of different periods of statehood experience on political instability 
Notes: This figure depicts the point estimate and the 95% confidence interval of the coefficient on 
Statehiste, reported in Table 1. Statehiste_aa is an ancestry-adjusted measure of statehood experience. For 
ease of comparison, I also estimate the benchmark model using the original state history index (1- 1950CE) 
developed by Bockstette et al. (2002). 
 
Figure 6. The effects of the Neolithic transition on state history 
Notes: This figure depicts the partial effects of the Neolithic transition on accumulated statehood experience 
(3500BCE – 2000CE). These results are based on the first-stage estimates reported in Table 3.  
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Table 1. State history and political instability, OLS estimates 
Dependent variable is PIS  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Periods of statehood 
 
3500BCE – 1CE  3500BCE – 1500CE  3500BCE – 2000CE  
3500BCE – 2000CE 
(Ancestry-adjusted) 
Statehiste   1.896***  1.547***  1.502***  1.444*** 
  [0.489]  [0.400]  [0.424]  [0.487] 
Absolute latitude  -3.918***  -3.823***  -3.790***  -4.214*** 
  [0.570]  [0.604]  [0.604]  [0.630] 
Terrain ruggedness   0.003***  0.003***  0.003***  0.003*** 
  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001] 
Mean elevation   -0.478**  -0.498**  -0.488**  -0.467** 
  [0.210]  [0.209]  [0.211]  [0.215] 
Range of Elevation  0.156**  0.138*  0.138*  0.152** 
  [0.071]  [0.071]  [0.072]  [0.071] 
Mean land suitability  0.307  0.283  0.250  0.294 
  [0.341]  [0.331]  [0.336]  [0.326] 
Range of land suitability  0.731***  0.691***  0.699***  0.528** 
  [0.235]  [0.236]  [0.241]  [0.253] 
Distance to the nearest waterway  0.060***  0.064***  0.060***  0.061*** 
  [0.019]  [0.018]  [0.019]  [0.019] 
Island country dummy  -0.250  -0.187  -0.195  -0.296 
  [0.225]  [0.257]  [0.252]  [0.250] 
Region dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
RESET   0.137  0.260  0.223  0.094 
Normality   0.067  0.182  0.236  0.192 
Observations  109  109  109  107 
R-squared  0.586  0.582  0.575  0.565 
Notes: This table presents OLS estimates of the effects of statehood experience on political instability, using a sample of non-European countries. 
Region dummies stand for binary variables for East Asia and Pacific, Latin America and Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, North America, 
South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa (Central Asia is omitted as the base group). This is based on the World Bank’s classification of regions. RESET 
denotes p-values of Ramsey’s test for functional form misspecification. Normality denotes p-values of Doornik-Hansen’s test for the normal 
distribution of the error terms. An intercept is included in all regressions, but is omitted to conserve space. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2. The relative importance of selection on unobserved confounders 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Treatment variable 
  
Baseline estimates – ?̂? 
(std. error) [R]  
Oster’s identified set (?̂?, 𝛽∗) 
(𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1.3 × 𝑅, 𝛿 = 1)   
Delta statistic (𝛿)  
for ?̂? = 0 
Statehiste (3500BCE – 1CE)   1.896*** (0.489) [0.586]  [1.896, 2.157]  2.119 > 1 
Statehiste (3500BCE – 1500CE)    1.547*** (0.400) [0.582]  [1.547, 1.855]  1.695 > 1 
Statehiste (3500BCE – 2000CE)    1.502*** (0.424) [0.575]  [1.502, 1.560]  1.764 > 1 
Statehiste_aa (3500BCE – 2000CE)   1.444*** (0.487) [0.565]  [1.444, 2.124]  4.283 > 1 
Geographic controls   Yes  Yes   
Region dummies   Yes  Yes   
Notes: This table reports the results of the coefficient stability test developed by Oster (2019). For ease of comparison, column (1) replicates the 
main results, including the estimated coefficients and standard errors of Statehiste, and R-squared values. The delta statistic in column (3) corresponds 
to the degree of selection on unobserved confounders relative to that on observed confounders. In column (2), I report Oster’s identified set, bounded 
by the baseline coefficients (?̂?) and the treatment effects adjusted for possible omitted variables bias (𝛽∗). They are constructed based on two 
restrictive assumptions, following Oster (2019). First, the delta statistic (𝛿) equals one, suggesting that the degree of selection on unobservables is 
proportional to that on observables. Second, the R-squared of a hypothetical regression (𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥) is assumed to be 30% larger than that of the baseline 





Table 3. State history and political instability, IV estimates 
Periods of statehood 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
3500BCE – 1CE  3500BCE – 1500CE  3500BCE – 2000CE  
3500BCE – 2000CE 
(Ancestry-adjusted) 
Panel A. First-stage estimates. Dependent variables is Statehiste 
Agyears 0.043***  0.040***  0.038***  0.033*** 
 [0.007]  [0.008]  [0.008]  [0.008] 
Panel B. Second-stage estimates. Dependent variable is political instability 
Statehiste  3.552***  3.826***  4.010***  4.601*** 
 [0.780]  [1.001]  [1.114]  [1.363] 
Panel C. Additional information 
Geographic controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
RESET 0.998  0.334  0.329  0.209 
Normality 0.195  0.713  0.439  0.518 
First-stage F-statistic 38.66  25.55  22.08  17.81 
Anderson-Rubin CI [2.24, 5.33]  [2.14, 6.30]  [2.36, 6.99]  [2.58, 8.51] 
Observations 106  106  106  105 
R-squared 0.546  0.485  0.461  0.405 
Notes: This table presents IV estimates of the effects of state history on political instability. Agyears is the length of time elapsed since the transition 
to sedentary agriculture. The effective first-stage F-statistic of excluded instruments is suggestive of the relevance of the instrument (Olea & Pflueger, 
2013). Following Andrews et al. (2019), I report identification-robust Anderson-Rubin confidence intervals, which are efficient even when Agyears 





Table 4. Controlling for potentially mediating variables 
Periods of statehood 
3500BCE – 2000CE  3500BCE – 2000CE (Ancestry-adjusted) 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A. First-stage estimates. Dependent variable is Statehiste 
Agyears  0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.040***  0.031*** 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 
 [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]  [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 
Panel B. Second-stage estimates. Dependent variable is PIS 
Statehiste 4.216*** 2.898*** 3.951*** 3.057***  5.088*** 3.252*** 4.601*** 3.566*** 
 [1.138] [0.973] [1.105] [0.884]  [1.517] [1.135] [1.378] [1.107] 
Lgdppc 0.060   0.030  0.060   0.036 
 [0.041]   [0.036]  [0.046]   [0.039] 
Institutions  -0.503***  -0.515***   -0.555***  -0.565*** 
  [0.090]  [0.091]   [0.090]  [0.100] 
Redist   0.114 1.536    -0.775 1.032 
   [1.040] [1.051]    [1.158] [1.038] 
Panel C. OLS estimates. Dependent variable is PIS 
Statehiste 1.415*** 1.261*** 1.544*** 1.270***  1.419** 1.427*** 1.538*** 1.554*** 
 [0.441] [0.357] [0.492] [0.459]  [0.547] [0.404] [0.565] [0.517] 
Lgdppc 0.012   0.010  0.011   0.016 
 [0.041]   [0.038]  [0.043]   [0.038] 
Institutions  -0.528***  -0.515***   -0.541***  -0.524*** 
  [0.091]  [0.093]   [0.094]  [0.096] 
Redist   -0.690 0.933    -0.991 0.709 
   [0.878] [0.912]    [0.920] [0.917] 
Panel D. Additional information 
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
First-stage F-statistic 23.17 20.55 22.79 24.43  15.41 18.14 17.56 17.88 
Anderson-Rubin CI [2.53, 7.26] [1.26, 5.30] [ 2.31, 6.91] [1.57, 5.25]  [2.84, 9.74] [1.57, 6.29] [2.56, 8.56] [1.92, 6.52] 
Observations 102 108 105 98  100 106 104 97 
Notes: This table replicates the baseline estimates by controlling for potential mechanisms underlying the relationship between Statehiste and PIS, 
including the log of income per capita (Lgdppc), institutional quality (Institutions) and income redistribution (Redist). A mediation analysis is 
provided in Table 10 (Section 7). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 5. Robustness to controlling for population diversity 
Periods of statehood 
 (1)  (2) 
 
3500BCE – 2000CE 
 3500BCE – 2000CE 
(Ancestry-adjusted) 
Panel A. First-stage estimates. Dependent variable is Statehiste 
Agyears  0.028***  0.028*** 
  [0.007]  [0.007] 
Panel B. Second-stage estimates. Dependent variable is PIS 
Statehiste  4.889***  4.897*** 
  [1.711]  [1.728] 
Panel C. OLS estimates. Dependent variable is PIS 
Statehiste  1.150**  1.031** 
  [0.515]  [0.501] 
Panel D. Additional information 
Predicted genetic diversity  Yes  Yes 
Ethnic fractionalization  Yes  Yes 
Ethnolinguistic polarization  Yes  Yes 
Geographic controls  Yes  Yes 
Region dummies  Yes  Yes 
First-stage F-statistic  17.15  16.13 
Anderson-Rubin CI  [2.35, 9.80]  [2.33, 9.86] 
Observations  108  106 
Notes: This table replicates the baseline estimates by controlling for three measures of population diversity, 
including predicted genetic diversity, ethnic fractionalization and ethnolinguistic polarization. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 6. Robustness to controlling for other factors 
Including additional controls (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A. First-stage estimates. Dependent variable is Statehiste 
Agyears  0.036*** 0.036*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.027*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.029*** 
 [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008] [0.009] [0.007] 
Panel B. Second-stage estimates. Dependent variable is PIS 
Statehiste (3500BCE – 2000CE) 3.782*** 3.134** 3.627*** 3.900*** 4.567** 4.160*** 4.071*** 5.108*** 
 [1.233] [1.316] [1.056] [1.112] [1.818] [1.187] [1.177] [1.561] 
Panel C. OLS estimates. Dependent variable is PIS 
Statehiste (3500BCE – 2000CE) 1.360*** 1.056** 1.468*** 1.409*** 1.023** 1.431*** 1.580*** 1.483*** 
 [0.459] [0.487] [0.493] [0.452] [0.476] [0.466] [0.435] [0.414] 
Panel D. Additional information 
Inequality Yes        
Trust  Yes       
Resource wealth   Yes      
Democracy    Yes     
Population     Yes    
Trade openness       Yes   
Urbanization       Yes  
Religions        Yes 
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
First-stage F-statistic 18.19 15.20 19.51 22.41 15.18 22.41 15.50 18.97 
Anderson-Rubin CI [1.95, 7.08] [1.18, 6.65] [1.85, 6.45] [2.25, 6.87] [1.87, 10.14] [2.40, 7.33] [2.32, 7.45] [2.79, 9.28] 
Observations 106 57 107 106 106 108 90 108 
Notes: This table replicates the baseline estimates by controlling for numerous causes of political instability. Additional controls include the Gini 
coefficient of inequality of post-tax post-transfer household income (Inequality) and social capital (Trust), as shown in columns 1 and 2. Resource 
wealth denotes four variables of resource endowments, including oil, gas, mineral and forest rents (as a proportion of GDP). I incorporate the Polity2 
index of democratic institutions (Democracy), population density and the size of population (Population), trade openness, and urban population as 
a proportion of total population (Urbanization) in columns (4) to (7). Moreover, I control for three variables, capturing the proportions of the total 
population practicing major religions such as Catholics, Muslims and Protestants (column 8). As reported in the online Appendix, the results remain 
broadly unchanged when using an ancestry-adjusted index of statehood experience (3500BCE – 2000CE). Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 7. A test of over-identifying restrictions 
Periods of statehood 
3500BCE – 2000CE  
3500BCE – 2000CE 
(Ancestry-adjusted) 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Panel A. First-stage estimates. Dependent variable is Statehiste 
Proximity  0.290*** 0.183**  0.262*** 0.156** 
 [0.073] [0.073]  [0.070] [0.067] 
Agyears  0.027***   0.024*** 
  [0.009]   [0.008] 
Panel B. Second-stage estimates. Dependent variable is PIS 
Statehiste  2.969*** 3.697***  3.139*** 4.208*** 
 [0.818] [0.861]  [0.989] [1.028] 
Panel C. Additional information 
Geographic controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
RESET 0.252 0.538  0.159 0.057 
Normality 0.291 0.352  0.264 0.517 
First-stage F-statistic 15.65 15.38  13.97 12.43 
Anderson-Rubin CI [1.59, 5.15] [1.93, 6.31]  [1.47, 5.98] [2.28, 7.77] 
Over-ID  0.574   0.589 
Observations 109 106  107 105 
R-squared 0.529 0.489  0.509 0.444 
Notes: This table replicates the IV estimates by using an alternative excluded instrument. Proximity is 
geographic proximity to regional frontiers in 1000BCE, constructed by Ang (2015). Over-ID denotes p-
values of Hansen’s J-test of over-identifying restrictions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, 




Table 8. State history and the incidence of unrest in repeated cross-country data 
Periods of statehood 
 
3500BCE – 2000CE  
3500BCE – 2000CE 
(Ancestry-adjusted) 
 (1)  (2)  (4)  (5) 
Estimator  Probit  IV Probit  Probit  IV Probit 
Panel A. OLS and IV second-stage estimates 
Statehiste  0.830***  2.486***  0.643***  2.949*** 
  [0.183]  [0.439]  [0.199]  [0.521] 
Geographic controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Lagged incidence of unrest  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations   4,500  4,409  4,436  4,377 
# of countries  107  104  105  103 
Pseudo R-squared  0.192    0.188   
Average marginal effect of Statehiste  0.239  0.151  0.187  0.081 
Panel B. IV first-stage estimates. Dependent variable is Statehiste 
Agyears     0.035***    0.029*** 
    [0.001]    [0.001] 
First-stage F-statistic    967.04    768.21 
Notes: This table reports Probit and IV Probit estimates of the effects of state history on the incidence of 
socio-political unrest from 1960 to 2010, using repeated cross-country data. The dependent variable is a 
dichotomous measure of the occurrence of riots and revolts, constructed by Acemoglu et al. (2019). The 
full model specification is expressed in Eq. [5]. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 9. The heterogeneous effects of state history on political instability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A. First-stage estimates. Dependent variables are different dimensions of state experience 
Agyears 0.444*** -0.021*** -0.042***  
 [0.056] [0.007] [0.008]  
Panel B. Second-stage estimates. Dependent variable is PIS 
State age 0.347***    
 [0.074]    
Average state autonomy (zautonomy)  -7.445***   
  [2.453]   
Average state coverage (zcoverage)   -3.622***  
   [0.940]  
Panel C. OLS estimates. Dependent variable is PIS 
State age  0.224***   0.259*** 
 [0.054]   [0.068] 
Average state autonomy (zautonomy)   -0.979*  -0.319 
  [0.536]  [0.475] 
Average state coverage (zcoverage)   -0.824** 0.405 
   [0.407] [0.423] 
Panel D. Additional information 
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Continent dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
First-stage F-statistic 62.01 7.91 30.09  
Anderson-Rubin CI [0.21, 0.50] [-18.86, -4.29] [-5.95, -2.04]  
Observations 109 109 109 109 
Notes: This table explores the contribution of different dimensions of statehood experience to the 
persistence of political instability. State age is the length of time elapsed since the first statehood was 
recorded (measured in millennia). Average zautonomy corresponds to the degree to which the rule was 
internally based. Average zcoverage captures the state’s territorial unity. As noted by Borcan et al. (2018), 
zautonomy and zcoverage are constructed conditional on the presence of a state above the tribal level (zpresence>0). 
Section 3 contains more details. Three components of statehood are not included altogether in the IV 
regression because the model is exactly identified (column 4). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 10. State history and political instability, ACDE estimates 
Periods of statehood 
 3500BCE – 2000CE  
3500BCE – 2000CE  
(Ancestry-adjusted) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Potentially mediating variables  Lgdppc  Institutions  Redist  Lgdppc  Institutions  Redist 
Panel A. OLS regressions. Dependent variable is PIS 
Statehiste  1.406**  1.167**  1.466**  1.460**  1.492***  1.449** 
[95% bootstrapped CI]  [0.31, 2.51]  [0.24, 2.10]  [0.37, 2.56]  [0.11, 2.79]  [0.42, 2.56]  [0.15, 2.75] 
Panel B. IV regressions. Dependent variable is PIS 
Statehiste  4.178*  3.039*  4.345**  5.133  3.599  5.321 
[95% bootstrapped CI]  [-0.08, 8.44]  [-0.05, 6.13]  [0.05, 8.64]  [-36.42, 46.69]  [-9.07, 16.27]  [-34.96, 45.60] 
Geographic controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Notes: This table reports the averaged controlled direct effects (ACDE) of Statehiste on PIS once accounting for the effects of potentially mediating 
variables. The results are estimated following a two-step regression procedure proposed by Acharya et al. (2016), and the main text contains a more 
detailed discussion. Following Acharya et al. (2016), consistent estimates are obtained through a bootstrapping procedure with 1000 replications. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  
  
 
 
